Created by Claudiu Tabac - © 2026
This material is open for educational and research use. Commercial use without explicit permission from the author is not allowed.
BP-006 Cloud Tenant Identity Enumeration
A critical reconnaissance technique where attackers probe cloud authentication surfaces to map identity landscapes, detect authentication mechanisms, and identify high-value targets before launching credential attacks.
🔍 What This Breach Pattern Is
Cloud Tenant Identity Enumeration occurs when attackers interact directly with cloud login surfaces—Azure AD/Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace—to determine which accounts exist, authentication types, MFA status, and login path behaviors. By observing unique error responses and timing differences, adversaries map tenant identity configurations with surgical precision.
This intelligence enables attackers to refine identity targets for password spraying, MFA fatigue attacks, OAuth phishing, session hijacking, and federation manipulation. Unlike basic enumeration, BP-006 exploits cloud platform–specific identity behaviors to create high-fidelity target lists.

Key Distinction
BP-006 advances beyond BP-005 by specifically targeting cloud provider identity responses, enabling adversaries to distinguish federated from cloud-native accounts and identify privilege levels through timing side-channels.
🧠 Attacker Objectives
Account Validation
Distinguish existing accounts from nonexistent ones, separating federated identities from cloud-only accounts to optimize attack vectors.
MFA Detection
Identify MFA-enabled versus MFA-disabled users, prioritizing targets with weaker authentication controls for credential attacks.
Privilege Mapping
Detect privileged accounts through timing side-channels and response patterns, revealing high-value administrative identities.
Guest Discovery
Locate B2B guest accounts and external identities that respond differently to login flows, exposing trust boundary weaknesses.
Attackers also target dormant or legacy accounts that may lack modern security controls and observe tenant-level identity configurations to understand the full authentication landscape before launching precision strikes.
⚠️ Misconfigurations That Enable BP-006
Four critical identity misconfigurations create exploitable gaps in cloud tenant defenses, allowing attackers to enumerate identities at scale without detection or throttling.
1
MC-001: Publicly Exposed User Identifiers
Login flows inadvertently reveal account existence or authentication type through differential error messages, timing variations, or redirect behaviors that leak identity information.
2
MC-019: Weak Lockout Policies
Insufficient rate limiting and account lockout thresholds enable high-volume enumeration attempts without triggering security controls or blocking mechanisms.
3
MC-075: Weak Network Segmentation
Identity authentication surfaces exposed globally without geographic restrictions or IP allowlisting, permitting enumeration from any internet location.
4
MC-146: Inconsistent Identity Trust Boundaries
Federation and guest identities exhibit different authentication behaviors, response codes, or timing patterns that leak structural information about trust relationships.
🛡️ Detection Signals
DL-009: Repeated Failed Lookups
Detects enumeration loops through systematic login response analysis
DL-027: Cross-Tenant Anomaly
Captures enumeration originating from foreign cloud tenants
DL-010: Naming Pattern Probes
Identifies large-scale identity probing typical of BP-006
DL-001: External Enumeration
Flags suspicious cloud-tenant interaction patterns

These detection signals work in concert to identify enumeration campaigns before attackers transition to credential acquisition. Deploy behavioral analytics that baseline normal authentication patterns and trigger alerts on statistical deviations indicative of systematic probing.
🧩 Identity Attack Chain Mapping
1
Stage 2: Identity Enumeration
BP-006 operates primarily in this phase, systematically mapping cloud tenant identities through authentication surface interactions.
2
Stage 3: Credential Acquisition
Enumeration intelligence directly feeds credential attack preparation, enabling targeted password spraying and phishing campaigns.

Attack Chain Impact
BP-006 dramatically increases the success rate of subsequent identity compromise by providing attackers with cloud-provider-level insight into authentication mechanisms, MFA enforcement, and federation configurations. This intelligence transforms broad credential attacks into surgical strikes.
🎭 Threat Actors Using This Pattern
Nation-state and sophisticated criminal groups leverage BP-006 as a foundational reconnaissance technique before launching identity-focused campaigns against cloud environments.
APT29 (ICTAM-001)
Cloud login signature analysis
Employs advanced techniques to fingerprint cloud authentication systems and identify federation weaknesses through systematic enumeration of Azure AD and Microsoft 365 tenants.
APT28 (ICTAM-002)
Hybrid identity enumeration
Maps both cloud and on-premises identity infrastructure to identify synchronization gaps and exploit inconsistencies between authentication domains.
Volt Typhoon (ICTAM-004)
Cloud + on-prem mapping
Conducts comprehensive identity landscape reconnaissance across hybrid environments to establish persistent access pathways and understand trust relationships.
Hive (ICTAM-015)
Pre-spray enumeration
Executes cloud-based enumeration campaigns to build high-confidence target lists before deploying password spraying operations against validated accounts.
🧵 Related Executive Storylines
ETS-001: Cloud Tenant Discovery
Demonstrates how initial cloud tenant enumeration cascades into full credential attack chains, combining BP-006 intelligence with password spraying, MFA bypass, and session hijacking to achieve complete identity takeover.
ETS-002: MFA Weakness Exploitation
Illustrates how enumeration of MFA-disabled accounts and weak authentication policies enables external identity takeover, particularly targeting B2B guest accounts and federated trust relationships.

About
Created by Claudiu Tabac — © 2026
This framework is open for educational and research use. Commercial use without explicit permission from the author is not allowed.