Created by Claudiu Tabac - © 2026
This material is open for educational and research use. Commercial use without explicit permission from the author is not allowed.
BP-045 Stealthy Persistence via Directory Sync Manipulation
What This Breach Pattern Is
This breach pattern occurs when adversaries compromise identity synchronization infrastructure—systems that serve as the automated backbone of enterprise identity management. Attackers target Entra ID Connect, SCIM provisioning agents, HR-to-IDP sync engines, custom lifecycle automation scripts, and third-party SCIM 2.0 connectors to establish persistence.
These synchronization systems manage critical identity lifecycle operations: user provisioning, attribute mapping, group membership assignment, role distribution, and activation/deactivation workflows. When attackers gain control of the sync engine or manipulate mapping rules, they create persistent backdoor identities that are automatically recreated, continuously reactivated, re-privileged on every sync cycle, hidden from administrative dashboards, and embedded directly into HR or source-of-truth systems. Provisioning drift represents one of the most challenging identity persistence mechanisms to detect and remediate.
Attacker Objectives
Self-Healing Accounts
Create hidden accounts that automatically reappear after deletion attempts, ensuring persistent access
Privilege Maintenance
Maintain privileged group membership through automated sync cycles, bypassing manual removal
Attribute Injection
Inject malicious attributes including admin flags that propagate across connected systems
HR Bypass
Circumvent HR-driven deactivation processes by manipulating source system records
This technique enables self-healing persistence that propagates across SaaS applications via SCIM, creating ghost identities mapped to fabricated HR entries. The result is long-term, self-repairing control of the identity fabric—nearly impossible to eradicate without addressing the root synchronization mechanism.
Misconfigurations That Enable BP-045
1
MC-441: Overly Broad SCIM Provisioning Scopes
Privileged groups or administrative roles included in automated SCIM provisioning workflows without proper scope isolation
2
MC-442: No Validation for Mapped Attributes
Attackers inject admin-enabling attributes through unvalidated attribute mapping configurations
3
MC-443: Weak Governance for HR Integration
HR-to-IDP synchronization fully trusted without security validation, compliance checks, or anomaly detection
4
MC-444: Sync Engine with Privileged API Permissions
Provisioning agents capable of creating service principals, assigning roles, or modifying tenant-level configurations
Detection Signals
01
DL-094: Anomalous SCIM Provisioning Events
Unexpected identity creation, modification, or reactivation patterns detected in provisioning logs
02
DL-024: Unusual API Access from Sync Engine
Provisioning service performing privileged or unusual actions beyond normal operational scope
03
DL-088: Unauthorized Group/Role Reassignment
Privilege automatically restored after administrative removal, indicating sync-based persistence
04
DL-093: Attribute Injection Detected
Unexpected attribute manipulation originating from provisioning flows, especially admin-enabling properties
Identity Attack Chain Mapping
1
Stage 4: Authentication Abuse
Compromise sync engine credentials or authentication mechanisms
2
Stage 5: Privilege Escalation
Manipulate provisioning rules to inject administrative privileges
3
Stage 7: Identity-Based Lateral Movement
Leverage synchronized identities to move across connected systems
4
Stage 8: Persistence via Identity
Establish self-healing backdoor accounts that continuously reappear
Provisioning drift creates an identity persistence mechanism that reappears continuously through automated synchronization, effectively evading traditional remediation approaches and requiring systemic changes to the provisioning architecture itself.
Threat Actors Using This Pattern
APT29 (ICTAM-001)
SCIM-lifecycle persistence specialists known for sophisticated directory synchronization manipulation
Supply-Chain Threat Groups (ICTAM-040)
Exploit provisioning drift to establish long-term access through compromised vendor integrations
RaaS Affiliates (ICTAM-020)
Build auto-recreated backdoor accounts as persistent access mechanisms for ransomware operations
Insider Threat Actors (ICTAM-025)
Manipulate HR-integrated identity flows to maintain unauthorized access post-termination
Related Executive Storylines
ETS-007
Identity Drift → Targeted Escalation
How automated provisioning systems become vehicles for privilege escalation and persistent compromise when configuration drift goes unmonitored
ETS-005
Federation Weakness → Full Cloud Takeover
The cascading impact of federation trust exploitation combined with provisioning manipulation leading to complete cloud environment compromise
About
Created by Claudiu Tabac — © 2026
This framework is open for educational and research use. Commercial use without explicit permission from the author is not allowed.