A condensed, high-accuracy identity tradecraft model for state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat groups operating in cloud environments
What This Page Covers
This resource provides a condensed, high-accuracy identity tradecraft model for state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. Rather than cataloging individual APT actors, this page focuses on shared identity-centric intrusion patterns observed across major threat groups.
Modern APT operations rely overwhelmingly on identity abuse rather than malware. These actors target authentication systems, federation protocols, token mechanisms, and cloud identity platforms to achieve persistent access and operational objectives.
Threat Groups Analyzed
APT29 (Cozy Bear)
APT28 (Fancy Bear)
APT10 (MenuPass)
APT41 (Double Dragon)
MuddyWater
Charming Kitten
Lazarus Group
Volt Typhoon
TA450
Winnti Group
Core Identity Behaviors of APT Threat Actors
Seven foundational identity behaviors consistently observed across global APT operations targeting cloud and hybrid identity infrastructure.
Stealthy Identity Enumeration
Pre-authentication reconnaissance of identity surfaces and authentication mechanisms
Credential & Token Acquisition
Social engineering combined with identity-native exploitation techniques
Federation Manipulation
Abuse of trust relationships and SAML/OAuth protocols
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation of IAM drift and overprivileged roles
Behavior 1: Stealthy Identity Enumeration
Pre-Auth Recon
APT operators perform deep reconnaissance of identity surfaces before launching attacks. This passive intelligence gathering identifies vulnerabilities in authentication systems without triggering security alerts.
Identifying target organization's cloud presence and tenant configurations
Username Format Harvesting
Mapping UPN structures and email patterns for valid account enumeration
Federation Fingerprinting
Analyzing SAML/OAuth endpoints and identity provider configurations
MFA Policy Probing
Testing multi-factor authentication requirements and bypass opportunities
Login Flow Analysis
Mapping authentication workflows through error message interrogation
Behaviors 2 & 3: Acquisition and Federation Abuse
Credential & Token Acquisition
APTs combine social engineering with identity-native techniques including OAuth consent phishing, session cookie theft, token replay from new locations, and reverse-proxy MFA bypass tools.
APT groups specialize in abusing trust relationships through forged SAML assertions, manipulated issuer validation, mismatched service provider metadata, and replay of stale federation tokens.
These combined techniques enable APTs to bypass traditional security controls by operating within legitimate authentication protocols. The abuse of OAuth consent flows and SAML trust chains allows attackers to masquerade as authorized users and applications.
Behaviors 4 & 5: Escalation and Machine Identity Abuse
Privilege Escalation via App Roles
APTs systematically target the weakest identity boundaries in cloud environments. They exploit overly broad application roles, stale cloud administrator privileges, dormant directory roles, and overprivileged service principals to gain elevated access.
Overly broad app role assignments with excessive permissions
Stale cloud admin privileges from departed employees
Dormant directory roles with lingering access rights
Overprivileged service principals with admin capabilities
A rapidly growing APT tactic targeting automated systems and deployment pipelines. Attackers compromise CI/CD workflows, extract embedded service principal secrets from build artifacts, abuse automation accounts with administrative roles, and hijack deployer account identities.
CI/CD Pipeline Compromise
Injection of malicious code into build and deployment workflows
Secret Extraction
Harvesting credentials embedded in configuration files and artifacts
Automation Account Takeover
Hijacking service accounts used for orchestration and provisioning
Not host-to-host movement, but identity-to-identity pivoting. APTs exploit SaaS-to-cloud trust relationships, cross-cloud role chaining, API-level privilege escalation, and token replay across disparate ecosystems to traverse organizational boundaries.
02
Long-Term Identity Persistence
The APT specialty: maintaining silent access for months or years. Techniques include long-lived refresh token persistence, hidden enterprise application permissions, federation trust overrides, and dormant account reactivation.
MFA bypass and authentication protocol manipulation
5
Stage 5: Privilege Escalation
Role exploitation and permission elevation
6
Stage 6: Token Tampering
SAML/JWT manipulation and signature bypass
7
Stage 7: Lateral Movement
Cross-service and cross-cloud pivoting
8
Stage 8: Persistence
Long-term access establishment
9
Stage 9: Objectives & Exfiltration
Data theft and operational goals
Mappings: Misconfigurations and Detection
Identity Misconfiguration Universe (IMU)
APTs systematically exploit misconfigurations across critical identity domains. These weaknesses provide low-risk, high-reward attack vectors that bypass traditional security controls.
Federation
Weak trust validation and certificate management
Cloud IAM
Overprivileged roles and stale permissions
Session Governance
Excessive token lifetimes and weak validation
Machine Identities
Exposed secrets and overprivileged service accounts
APT groups operate slowly, quietly, and strategically. Identity compromise is their preferred method because it provides operational advantages that traditional malware cannot match.
Bypasses Endpoint Security
No malware signatures or behavioral indicators on target systems
Persists Across Boundaries
Cloud tokens work across applications, services, and geographic regions
Blends Into Normal Activity
Legitimate credentials produce legitimate-looking authentication events
Provides Invisible Admin Paths
Privileged access without triggering privilege escalation alerts
Evades Detection
Extremely difficult to detect without specialized identity telemetry and analytics
Identity is the perfect weapon for long-term espionage. Modern APT operations have fundamentally shifted from host-based compromise to identity-based persistence, requiring organizations to rethink their detection and response strategies.